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A hybrid strain of enteroaggregative and Shiga toxin 
2-producing Escherichia coli (EAEC-STEC) serotype 
O104:H4 strain caused a large outbreak of haemo-
lytic uraemic syndrome and bloody diarrhoea in 
2011 in Europe. Two surveys were performed in the 
European Union (EU) and European Economic Area 
(EEA) countries to assess their laboratory capabilities 
to detect and characterise this previously uncommon 
STEC strain. Prior to the outbreak, 11 of the 32 coun-
tries in this survey had capacity at national reference 
laboratory (NRL) level for epidemic case confirmation 
according to the EU definition. During the outbreak, 
at primary diagnostic level, nine countries reported 
that clinical microbiology laboratories routinely used 
Shiga toxin detection assays suitable for diagnosis 
of infections with EAEC-STEC O104:H4, while 14 coun-
tries had NRL capacity to confirm epidemic cases. Six 
months after the outbreak, 22 countries reported NRL 
capacity to confirm such cases following initiatives 
taken by NRLs and the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) Food- and Waterborne 
Disease and Zoonoses laboratory network. These data 
highlight the challenge of detection and confirma-
tion of epidemic infections caused by atypical STEC 
strains and the benefits of coordinated EU laboratory 
networks to strengthen capabilities in response to a 
major outbreak.
Introduction
Between May and August 2011, an outbreak of Shiga 
toxin 2-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) affected over 
4,000 individuals in Europe. It was associated with the 
highest number of cases of haemolytic uraemic syn-
drome (HUS) reported to date (782 confirmed and 119 
suspected cases) in the European Union (EU)/European 
Economic Area (EEA) [1]. The first cases were reported 
from Germany, where the laboratory characterisation 
of the causative bacterial strain was conducted [2,3]. 
The outbreak strain was identified as STEC with unu-
sual characteristics. These included the rare serotype 
O104:H4, lack of attaching/effacing pathogenicity 
island of virulent STEC strains, as indicated by the lack 
of the eae gene, but harbouring virulence markers of 
enteroaggregative E. coli, e.g. presence of aggR gene, 
and exhibiting a multidrug resistance phenotype, 
including production of CTX-M-15 extended spectrum 
beta-lactamase (ESBL) [4-6]. At the beginning of June 
2011, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) published an EU epidemic case defini-
tion for this outbreak strain [7] to allow standardised 
reporting by the EU/EEA countries and comparison of 
data at EU level for outbreak monitoring.
Epidemiological investigations conducted in Germany, 
France, Denmark and other countries indicated con-
taminated fenugreek sprouts as likely vehicle of the 
infections [8,9]. A trace-back global exercise, led by the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), showed that an 
implicated lot of fenugreek seeds had been imported 
to 24 EU Member States [10]. 
In addition to the risk of spread of STEC O104:H4 , illus-
trated by STEC O104:H4 cases in Bordeaux [11], in the 
early phases of this outbreak, several points raised 
public health concern: (i) the complexity of the detec-
tion and identification of STEC that made it difficult 
to diagnose cases and hampered the assessment of 
the effect of disease control measures, (ii) the limited 
sensitivity of routine diagnostic methods for detecting 
this serotype and pathotype that suggested potential 
surveillance gaps [12-15], and (iii) the unusually high 
rate of renal and neurological complications and death 
among adult cases [16-18]. 
The mission of ECDC is to identify, assess and commu-
nicate current and emerging threats to human health 
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posed by infectious diseases in the EU/EEA. To adress 
the concerns raised in terms of laboratory diagnos-
tics, ECDC investigated how well the EU/EEA coun-
tries were able to diagnose and confirm STEC O104:H4 
cases according to the EU epidemic case definition and 
whether rapid laboratory capacity building initiatives 
were needed. In this article, we present the results of 
two laboratory capacity surveys in the EU/EEA before, 
during, and after the 2011 STEC O104:H4 outbreak 
respectively, and describe capacity building activities 
taken at national and European levels in response to 
the outbreak.
Methods
A short questionnaire to survey laboratory practices 
for enabling application of the epidemic case definition 
and identification of the epidemic STEC O104:H4 strain 
was sent by email to the STEC/VTEC contact points 
of the European Food- and Waterborne Diseases and 
Zoonoses Network (FWD-Net) on 2 June 2011 (first sur-
vey). The survey focused on availability of the following 
strain characterisation tests at national reference labo-
ratory (NRL) level: O serogrouping, H serotyping, Shiga 
toxin 1 (stx1) and 2 gene (stx2) detection and subtyp-
ing, eae, aggR and EAggEC virulence gene detection, 
multilocus sequence typing (MLST) and pulsed-field 
gel electrophoresis (PFGE) analysis with XbaI macror-
estriction. The survey also inquired about information 
available at national level on diagnostic capabilities in 
clinical microbiology practice (i.e. at primary level) for 
Shiga toxin and gene detection and asked to indicate 
the source of this informarion on primary level diag-
nostic capabilities. Data received by 2 July 2011 were 
included for the purpose of this analysis.
A follow-up survey was sent in January 2012 (sec-
ond survey), assessing the NRL capabilities for STEC 
detection and characterisation available in April 2011 
(before the outbreak) and December 2011 (after the 
outbreak). The survey also addressed actions taken at 
national level from June to December 2011 to stengthen 
STEC O104:H4 diagnostic capabilities and/or report-
ing of cases. Furthermore, the survey participants 
were asked to answer whether they need services for 
STEC strain characterisation and to indicate the type 
of support expected from ECDC in STEC outbreaks and 
Figure 1
Availability of Shiga toxin detection tests at primary diagnostic level in European Union and European Economic Area, June 
2011
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No data available to ECDC
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; EU/EEA: European Union/European Economic Area.
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in general for investigation of outbreaks of emerging, 
highly virulent pathogenic organisms of international 
concern. All responses received by the end of March 
2012 were included in the analysis presented here.  
For the United Kingdom, data were received for England 
and Wales, and for Scotland. No data were received for 
Northern Ireland. Therefore, England and Wales, and 
Scotland were considered as separate countries, hence 
the survey comprised 32 instead of 30 EU/EEA coun-
tries. For the analysis of the data, the denominator 
used was 32 to allow for comparison of data between 
the two surveys. 
To compare the proportion of countries reporting con-
firmed epidemic cases to the laboratory capability at 
clinical diagnostic level, Fisher’s exact test was used 
with two-tailed probability.
Results
In the first survey in mid 2011, 24 of 32 countries 
responded to the questionnaire and in the second sur-
vey in early 2012, responses came from 29 countries, 
leading to response rates of 75% and 91% respectively.
First survey (mid 2011)
Availability of Shiga toxin detection 
tests at primary diagnostic level 
Data showed that in seven countries, information avail-
able was based on national external quality assessment 
results and/or national surveys of testing practices of 
clinical laboratories, conducted in 2010 and/or 2011. 
For 17 countries, the information was based on per-
sonal communication to NRL.
Based on the information available to the NRLs, stx1 
and stx2 and/or Stx 1/2 assays were routinely used 
in clinical laboratories in nine of the 32 countries. For 
these nine countries, the percentage of clinical labo-
ratories using these assays routinely varied between 
15 to 90% laboratories per country with a median of 
65%. According to NRLs, in three countries, such tests 
were used by clinical laboratories occasionally, e.g. in 
the case of outbreaks. Shiga toxin 1 and 2 toxin and/or 
gene tests were not used in clinical laboratories in 12 
countries. Figure 1 shows the availability of these tests 
at clinical laboratory level by country in the European 
EU/EEA.
Of note, six of nine countries with clinical microbiology 
Stx/stx detection capacity had reported STEC O104:H4 
epidemic cases as compared with two of 12 countries 
with no capacity (p<0.05, Table ).
STEC O104:H4 case confirmation capabilities 
at national reference laboratory level at 
the time of the 2011 outbreak 
The responses demonstrated that in 18 of 32 coun-
tries, O104 serogrouping test was available, while H4 
serotyping test was available in 14 countries. Tests for 
detection of stx1/stx2, eae and aggR were available in 
20, 19, and 14 countries, respectively. 
Analyses with PFGE using XbaI macrorestriction accord-
ing to the PulseNet protocol were available in 18 NRLs 
and MLST was performed only in five laboratories .        
The data on the availability of the above tests showed 
that 14 NRLs were capable of confirming an outbreak-
related case according to the EU epidemic case defini-
tion. In four additional countries, the NRLs were able to 
confirm cases only if epidemiological criteria were met. 
In six countries the NRLs reported lack of specific tests 
for confirmation of epidemic STEC O104:H4 cases.
Second survey (early 2012) 
Capabilities of NRLs for case detection 
and identification of STEC O104:H4 
before and after the 2011 outbreak 
Data obtained revealed that prior to the STEC O104:H4 
outbreak in April 2011, 11 of 32 countries had NRL 
capacity to confirm STEC O104:H4 cases. In December 
2011, five months after the outbreak, 22 countries 
reported such NRL capacity (p<0.05, Figure 2). 
There was an increase in the number of STEC detection 
and identification methods at NRL level in December 
2011 compared with April 2011 (Figure 3). The change 
was most pronounced for methods required for STEC 
O104:H4 case confirmation. From April to December 
2011, 15 countries had developed O104 serogrouping 
capability, eight H4 serotyping capability, six aggR 
detection test and four stx1/2 and eae detection tests.
Table 
Routine testing for Shiga toxin genes at clinical 
microbiology level in European Union and European 
Economic Area countries reporting or not reporting 
confirmed epidemiological cases of Shiga toxin 2- 
producing Escherichia coli O104:H4, July 2011 
Shiga toxin diagnostic 
testing at clinical 
laboratories




Available in more  
than 15% 6 3 9 
Available only in some, 
in case of outbreaks 1 2 3 
Not available 2 10 12 
a For the United Kingdom, data were received for England and 
Wales, and for Scotland. No data were received for Northern 
Ireland. Therefore, England and Wales, and Scotland were 
considered as separate countries, hence the survey comprised 




Capabilities of national reference laboratories in the European Union and European Economic Area for case detection and 
identification of Shiga toxin 2-producing Escherichia coli O104:H4 before and after the 2011 outbreak, March 2012
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In April 2011, 24 countries reported capabilities for 
assessing ESBL production: 12 countries reported 
testing for both gene detection and phenotypic char-
acterisation, and another 12 used phenotypic charac-
terisation alone. In December 2011, 26 countries tested 
for ESBL at NRL level: 14 used phenotypic detection 
alone, 11 countries used both phenotypic characterisa-
tion and genotypic detection and one tested for ESBL 
production based on gene detection alone. 
Twenty-six countries indicated that specific actions 
had been taken at national level during and/or follow-
ing the outbreak to increase STEC O104:H4 detection 
capabilities. Such actions were directed at primary 
microbiology diagnostic services in the form of (i) 
guidance on diagnostic methods for 23 countries, (ii) 
pathogen isolation and referral of isolates in 21, and 
(iii) case reporting in 20 countries. Recommendations 
regarding E. coli strain characterisation methods as 
well as participation in ad hoc external quality assess-
ment (EQA) schemes for diagnostic services were given 
to clinical laboratories in 10 EU/EEA countries. 
Needs for inter-laboratory services for Shiga 
toxin-producing E. coli strain characterisation
Despite these efforts to increase capability for STEC 
detection and characterisation, nine countries reported 
needs for access to strain characterisation services 
from a reference laboratory in another country, includ-
ing for serotyping of rare STEC serogroups and MLST. 
Two countries reported NRL service arrangements with 
reference laboratories in other countries for testing 
rare STEC serotypes. 
Figure 3
Number of Shiga toxin 2-producing Escherichia coli detection and identification methods at national reference laboratories in 
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ESBL: extended spectrum beta-lactamase; EU/EEA: European Union/European Economic Area; PFGE: pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; STEC: 
Shiga toxin 2-producing Escherichia coli.
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Initiatives expected from ECDC to support national 
response to outbreaks of emerging, highly virulent 
pathogenic organisms of international concern
The needs most frequently mentioned included (i) 
early warning and information exchange (17 countries), 
(ii) protocols for pathogen isolation and detection (13 
countries), and (iii) provision of diagnostic materi-
als and reagents (12 countries). One country did not 
expect any support.
Discussion
Human infections caused by STEC O157:H7 account for 
nearly half of reported cases of STEC disease in the 
EU/EEA countries [19]. Non-O157 serotypes are much 
less commonly reported as causes of human disease, 
mainly due to weight of diagnostics towards identifi-
cation of O157 serogroup. The large STEC outbreak in 
2011 in the EU/EEA was caused by the rare serotype and 
atypical enteroaggregative pathotype STEC O104:H4. 
Considering the impact of this outbreak and its spread 
across borders, it was essential to assess the capac-
ity of EU/EEA countries to confirm epidemic cases and 
to target any necessary capacity building activities. 
The results from such assessement presented here 
show that during this STEC O104:H4 outbreak, sev-
eral countries lacked the capacity at national level to 
detect and characterise STEC O104:H4 cases accord-
ing to the EU epidemic case definition [7]. Importantly, 
even greater case detection gaps existed at primary 
diagnostic level, based on the information reported by 
NRLs. Diagnostic capability at clinical laboratory level 
by use of Shiga toxin detection for non-O157 STEC was 
associated with more frequent reporting of epidemic 
cases of this rare STEC serotype. Diagnostic and char-
acterisation capacity at NRL level may compensate in 
part for lack of routine Shiga toxin testing at primary 
level. However, at the onset of the outbreak, two-thirds 
of the EU/EEA countries reported no NRL capacity for 
confirmation of STEC O104:H4 cases, which along with 
the lack of routine Shiga toxin screening in clinical 
laboratories, raises the possibility that previous out-
breaks of STEC strains of rare serotypes/pathotypes, 
might have not been detected. This indicates an inad-
equate level of preparedness of Europe’s public health 
microbiology system to detect early unusual events, 
such as the emergence of new pathotypes of STEC. It 
underlines the need to strengthen the microbiology 
laboratory capacity for timely communicable disease 
alert and response. 
Our study has some limitations: information on clini-
cal laboratories testing practices was based to a large 
extend on personal communication to NRLs (i); avail-
ability of Shiga toxin gene detection tests at NRL level 
and not that of Stx1 and Stx2 immunoassays was 
assessed in the first survey (ii); the results of the first 
survey should be interpreted with caution since it was 
conducted during the outbreak when testing prac-
tice was subject to changes and because it received 
a lower response rate than the second survey (iii). 
Nevertheless, our findings of low capacity for detection 
of non-O157 STEC infections are in line with observa-
tions made by others. A survey of laboratory practices 
for identification of STEC as part of the United States 
(US) Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network 
showed that only 11% of laboratories used a method 
that would detect non-O157 STEC [20]. It is noteworthy 
that in this survey, conducted in 2007 only half of the 
laboratories routinely tested all specimens for non-
O157 STEC. Another study conducted within the same 
network, showed that besides the available laboratory 
capacities, the correct identification of STEC infections 
also depended on physicians knowledge of STEC and 
ability to correctly interpret a positive Shiga toxin test 
result [21]. Thus, laboratory diagnostic and reference 
testing capacity would not be sufficient for timely and 
reliable surveillance unless clinical samples and iso-
lates are collected for testing. 
Amplification of DNA can be useful for rapid STEC 
detection in stool specimens [22,23] and has been 
shown to be cost-effective for diagnosing infections 
with STEC O157 and other intestinal pathogens [24]. 
However, when used without culture confirmation, 
such tests could generate high rates of false positive 
results, leading to over-reporting and unnecessary 
treatment and public health measures [25]. In addition 
to that, referral of STEC isolates to NRLs is needed to 
perform epidemiological typing in support to cluster 
detection and source tracing. Due to the ongoing con-
solidation of clinical laboratory services and increased 
use of culture-independent diagnostic techniques, the 
importance of culture confirmation could be overlooked 
and thus impede microbiological outbreak investiga-
tions. Although we could not find any published data 
illustrating how epidemiological investigations were 
hampered due to lack of timely culture confirmation 
in Europe, such information is available from the US 
[20,25]. In this context, the post-outbreak increase in 
NRL capabilities to characterise STEC O104:H4 isolates 
does not guarantee preparedness of EU/EEA public 
health microbiology system to detect this rare sero-
type and pathotype. It critically depends on primary 
case ascertainment by clinical diagnostic testing prac-
tice for non-O157 STEC and referral of isolates for refer-
ence testing. 
In Europe, external quality assessment of NRL capa-
bilities to characterise non-O157 STEC in the FWD-Net 
laboratories, showed that typing proficiency varied 
depending on serotype with better performance for 
STEC O157:H7 than other, less commonly reported 
serotypes [26]. Another survey of services of NRLs 
in EU/EEA countries for detection and characterisa-
tion of STEC, Campylobacter, Listeria monocytogenes, 
Salmonella, Shigella and Yersinia showed gaps in the 
capacity and reproducibility of methods used for their 
early detection and characterisation [27]. Capacity 
strengthening actions and method harmonisation are 
undertaken at EU/EEA level, via the ECDC Food- and 
Waterborne Diseases and Zoonoses programme and 
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FWD-Net, to ensure that Europe has a reliable surveil-
lance system for enteric pathogens. 
This study shows increased EU/EEA NRL capabilities 
for STEC detection and characterisations following the 
2011 STEC O104:H4 outbreak. This is due to efforts 
taken at national and EU/EEA levels. At national level, 
measures were implemented to increase referral of 
specimens from suspected cases of STEC O104:H4 to 
the NRL and increase the NRL’s capabilities to detect 
epidemic cases. At EU level, rapid development of 
novel PCR-based diagnostic methods and sharing of 
these protocols through the laboratories in the FWD-
Net contributed to strengthening the capacity to detect 
and confirm STEC O104:H4 cases in NRLs [6,28,29]. In 
early June, ECDC published the EU epidemic case defi-
nition and issued technical guidance on microbiological 
testing methods on its website and provided links to 
expert sources of information in the EU/EEA countries 
[30]. In addition, ECDC supplied the NRLs in the EU/EEA 
countries with specific diagnostic reagents and refer-
ence materials as requested. Eighteen NRLs received 
O104 anti-serum and 19 received K9 anti-serum and 
enteroaggregative STEC control strains, with different 
O:H combinations and stx subtypes, including a STEC 
O104:H4 strain. 
These rapid and coordinated capacity building efforts 
for STEC detection and characterisation illustrate the 
importance of the EU network and participating NRLs 
to work in close collaboration with the EU food safety 
experts and respective national laboratories. The rapid 
exchange of information at EU level during this out-
break was key in the coordination of such efforts. The 
existing Epidemic Intelligence Information System for 
FWD (EPIS FWD) facilitated the cooperation between 
FWD-Net laboratories. The EU Reference Laboratory 
for STEC/VTEC, operating in the area of food and feed 
safety, rapidly developed a validated laboratory proto-
col to detect this particular pathotype in food and envi-
ronmental samples and shared this protocol through 
EPIS FWD [29]. ECDC also produced rapid risk assess-
ments and EU epidemiological updates during the out-
break. A toolkit for investigation of and response to 
food- and waterborne disease outbreaks with an EU 
dimension was published in February 2012 and is avail-
able on the ECDC website. For enhanced surveillance of 
STEC/VTEC, the European Surveillance System (TESSy) 
metadataset was revised by including new variables 
on specific genes, i.e. aggR and aaiC, for reporting of 
STEC. 
In conclusion, Europe’s public health microbiology lab-
oratory capacity such as that reported for monitoring 
emerging STEC outbreaks has been improved via dedi-
cated resources at national level and via cross-sector 
and cross-border collaborations conducted by public 
health institutions to support timely and reliable sur-
veillance for disease control.
The STEC/VTEC experts of the European Food- and 
Waterborne Diseases and Zoonoses Network 
The members of the network, who provided the survey data 
are: 
Austria - Sabine Schlager at the National Reference Center 
(NRC) for Escherichia coli including Verotoxin producing E. 
coli;
Belgium - Denis Pierard at the NRC VTEC/STEC, Universitair 
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Bulgaria -  Petar Petrov of the NRL for Enteric Pathogens, 
Sofia
Cyprus - Panayiota Maikanti-Charalampous at the Reference 
laboratory for Salmonella and other enteric  pathogens;
Czech Republic - Monika Marejkova at the NRL  for E. coli and 
Shigella;
Germany - Angelika Fruth and Rita Prager at the NRC for 
Salmonella and other enteric bacteria  at the Robert Koch 
Institute;
Denmark - Flemming Scheutz of the WHO Collaborating 
Centre for Reference and Research on Escherichia and 
Klebsiella;
Estonia - Rita Peetso at the Central Laboratory of 
Communicable diseases, Health Board, 
Finland - Anja Siitonen and Ulla-Maija Nakari at the 
Bacteriology Unit, National Institute for Health and Welfare;
France - Malika Gouali at the Centre National de Référence 
des Salmonella, E. coli et Shigella, Institut Pasteur
Greece – Kassiani Mellou from the Greek Centre for Disease 
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for enteric pathogens;
Iceland - Hjordis Hardardottir at the Department Of Clinical 
Microbiology, Landspitali University Hospital;
Ireland - Anne Carroll and Eleanor McNamara of the Public 
Health  Laboratory;
 Italy - Alfredo Caprioli at Istituto Superiore di Sanità, 
Latvia - Solvita Selderina at the East Clinical University 
Hospital „Infectology Center of Latvia”
Lithuania - Ruta Jankauskiene of the Lithuanian National 
Public Health Surveillance Laboratory;
Luxembourg - Catherine Ragimbeau at the National Health 
Laboratory;
Netherlands - Max E.O.C. Heck of the Laboratory for 
Infectious Diseases and Perinatal Screening;
Norway - Astrid Louise Wester from the NRL on 
Enteropathogenic bacteria;
 Poland - Jolanta Szych at the Laboratory of Enteric Rods;
Portugal - Jorge Machado from the Laboratório Nacional 
de Referência de Infeções Gastrointestinais – Lab. de 
Salmonella, E. coli e outras bactérias entéricas;
Romania - Codruta-Romanita Usein at the Molecular 
Epidemiology Laboratory and Bacterial Enteric Infections 
Laboratory;
Sweden - Cecilia Jernberg of the Swedish Institute for 
Communicable Disease Control;
Slovenia - Marija Trkov, Laboratory of Medical Microbiology, 
National Institute of Public Health  and Eva Grilc Department 
of Communicable Diseases, National Institute of Public 
Health;
Slovak Republic - Zuzana Sirotna at the NRC of Environmental 
Microbiology, Public Health Authority
Spain - Silvia Herrera León at the Reference Laboratory for 
E. coli, National Centre for Microbiology, Institute of Health 
Carlos III;
England and Wales - Claire Jenkins at the Gastrointestinal 
Infections Reference Unit;
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